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ADHESION THEORY IN CALIFORNIA:
AN UPDATE
by Richard P. Sybert*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, the author published an article in this journal entitled Ad-
hesion Theory in California: A Suggested Redefinition and Its Applica-
tion to Banking,' which surveyed California law on contracts of
adhesion. Contracts of adhesion are standardized form contracts
which are offered by the stronger of the contracting parties on a "take-
it-or-leave-it" basis.2 The earlier article considered application of the
law of adhesion contracts to form contracts in the banking industry.3 It
suggested that the doctrine of adhesion contracts, which in some in-
stances had been phrased as a substantive rule of law to meet the "rea-
sonable expectations" of the weaker of the contracting parties,4 should
be redefined as basically a notice requirement, with substantive objec-
tions to contract terms to be dealt with under the legal heading of
* A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1973; J.D., cum laude, Harvard University,
1976; member, State Bars of California, Hawaii, and Washington; attorney, Sheppard, Mul-
lin, Richter & Hampton, Los Angeles; adjunct Professor in Commercial Law, Loyola Law
School. Mr. Sybert has authored numerous articles on commercial and antitrust law.
The author is grateful for the initial research done for this article by Mr. Frank A.
Uribie, A.B., Stanford University, 1976; M.M., J.D., Northwestern University, 1980; mem-
ber, State Bar of California; attorney, Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, Beverly Hills.
1. 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 297 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Sybert]. The article has since
been cited by the California Supreme Court in Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807,
623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981), and by the Alaska Supreme Court in Burgess Con-
str. Co. v. Alaska, 614 P.2d 1380 (1980).
2. Contracts of adhesion have been defined in a variety of ways in reported California
decisions. See, e.g., Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr.
781, 784 (1st Dist. 1961) ("A standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party
of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to
adhere to the contract or reject it."); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882, 377
P.2d 284, 297, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 185 (1962) ("The term refers to a standardized contract
prepared entirely by one party to the transaction for the acceptance of the other; such a
contract, due to the disparity in bargaining power between the draftsman and the second
party, must be accepted or rejected by the second party on a 'take it or leave it' basis, without
opportunity for bargaining and under such conditions that the 'adherer' cannot obtain the
desired product or service save by acquiescing in the form agreement.").
3. Sybert, supra note 1, at 328-31. The form contracts considered included those in-
volving bank service charges, stop payments on guaranteed checks, and changes in existing
contracts such as credit cards.
4. Id at 305 n.59. See also id at 309-10 (formulation of adhesion "principles").
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unconscionability.5
The present article traces developments in adhesion theory in Cal-
ifornia over the past four years.6 ,There have been relatively few deci-
sions during that period. However, a group of new cases concerning
arbitration clauses has for the first time threatened to apply adhesion
theory to commercial settings, whereas previously it has been largely
5. Id at 321-23.
6. The prior article did not address a number of cases decided prior to 1978. These
included Fresno Economy Import Used Cars, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 76
Cal. App. 3d 272, 142 Cal. Rptr. 681 (5th Dist. 1977); Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc.,
65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 135 Cal. Rptr. 230 (4th Dist. 1976); University of Judaism v. Trans-
america Ins. Co., 61 Cal. App. 3d 937, 132 Cal. Rptr. 907 (2d Dist. 1976); Powell v. Central
Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Assn., 59 Cal. App. 3d 540, 130 Cal. Rptr. 635 (3d Dist. 1976); Union
Bank v. Ross, 54 Cal. App. 3d 290, 126 Cal. Rptr. 646 (2d Dist. 1976).
In Gamer, the plaintiff, a lawyer, appealed from a judgment in favor of the defendant in
a class action to recover allegedly usurious interest paid on a securities margin account. He
attacked the choice-of-law provision in the agreement between the parties on the grounds
that the contract was one of adhesion. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment, finding
that the choice-of-law provision was not invalid as a matter of law simply because it was
contained in a contract of adhesion. The court stated that the "'plaintiff did not say he did
not read the contract he signed, did not say that any of its clauses was not understood, or
was contrary to what he expected, did say that subsequently he examined so-called 'cus-
tomer agreements' from five other brokerages. . . substantially identical to the form signed
by me.'" 65 Cal. App. 3d at 286, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 233. The court held that standardized
forms were valid and enforceable according to their terms unless they were ambiguous, even
if adhesion contracts. "It requires more than a showing that a contract was on a printed
form prepared by one of the parties to make it invalid as a contract of adhesion. Very many
of the contracts upon which people generally rely and whose provisions are performed faith-
fully by both parties are on such forms." Ird Thus, the court followed the proposal set forth
in the earlier article that "contracts of adhesion" will be enforced if there is notice, if the
adherer understands that notice, and if there are no ambiguous terms or unconscionable
clauses.
In Powell, the court rejected the contention by plaintiff borrowers, real estate developers
and financiers that a loan agreement provision, permitting a savings and loan association to
raise or lower the interest rate according to that paid its own depositors, was illusory and
invalid as part of a contract of adhesion. The court found that the plaintiffs had read the
contract and understood it, because they were "sophisticated borrowers in the field of real
estate development," and had a choice of source of loans available to them. 59 Cal. App. 3d
at 551, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 641. The court noted, "It]here is nothing sinful or illegal about a
contract of adhesion; the only significant result of the existence of such a contract is that it is
interpreted against the supplier of the goods or services (who prepared it) so as to meet the
reasonable expectations of the customer." Id, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 642 (citation omitted).
Again, this comports with the earlier proposal.
In Union Bank v. Ross, the court held that exclusionary clauses and provisions limiting
liability, between parties of unequal bargaining strength, "are ineffective in the absence of a
plain and clear notification to the public, and an understanding consent." 54 Cal, App. 3d at
296, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50. The court held, however, that the plaintiff "may not properly
argue that he did not give an understanding consent because he failed to read the contract."
The bank could not be responsible for such failure. Id, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
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limited to consumer cases. 7 These same cases, however, have been ex-
plicitly decided as "unconscionability" or due process cases, notwith-
standing the presence of dicta concerning adhesion contracts. There is
some hope, therefore, that adhesion theory will be limited to procedure.
II. TRADITIONAL ADHESION THEORY IN CALIFORNIA
Adhesion contracts are form contracts, usually offered to the gen-
eral public on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. Although they are clearly
susceptible to overreaching by the stronger party who writes the terms,
contracts of adhesion are by no means inherently evil. To the contrary,
as this author noted previously:
Through advance knowledge on the part of the enterprise
offering the contract that its relationship with each individual
consumer or offeree will be uniform, standard and fixed, the
device of form contracts introduces a degree of efficiency,
simplicity, and stability. When such contracts are used
widely, the savings in cost and energy can be substantial. An
additional benefit is that the goods and services which are
covered by these contracts are put within the reach of the gen-
eral public, whose sheer size might prohibit widespread distri-
bution if the necessary contractual relationships had to be
individualized. Transactional costs, and therefore the possi-
ble prices of these goods and services, are reduced.
In short, form contracts appear to be a necessary con-
comitant of a sophisticated, mass-consumption economy.
They have social and economic utility.8
Moreover, there is no way to redress the adhesive nature of such con-
tracts, since disparity of bargaining power is a function of status, not
particular contract terms.9
Thus, adhesion contracts are here to stay. In response, California
courts have fashioned a specialized "adhesion theory," permitting them
to conform adhesive contract terms to the weaker party's "reasonable
7. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
8. Sybert, supra note 1, at 298, quotedin Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d at 818
n.15, 623 P.2d at 171 n.15, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 610 n.15.
9. Sybert, supra note 1, at 314: "[T]he judicial system is not designed to remake the
fabric of society. It cannot undo the adhesive nature of a contract because it has no power to
equalize bargaining strength to the point of ensuring genuine negotiation. It cannot break
General Motors down to the economic level of John Doe." Id
In some instances the California Legislature has enacted statutory forms of certain
kinds of contracts, e.g., swimming pool sales, retail installment contracts for car purchases,
but this then simply makes the agreement adhesive for both parties.
1983]
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expectations."'" Despite a rule of such potentially sweeping substance,
however, most of the adhesion cases have been decided by using the
familiar rule that ambiguities are construed against the drafting
party.1' As put by one court, "despite the fact that contracts of adhe-
sion are the product of mass production and afford the party to whom
they are tendered little, if any, room in which to bargain, they are per-
fectly valid and, in the absence of ambiguity, are enforced according to
their terms."' 2 Further, the "reasonable expectations" test has been
narrowed even more by being framed in terms of a notice provision
rather than a substantive rule of law; it has been held that in an adhe-
sion setting, contract terms-usually exculpatory or limiting clauses on
the stronger party's liability or performance-which do not meet the
weaker party's "reasonable expectations," must be the subject of clear
notice if they are to be held effective.
1 3
The earlier article concluded that the California cases supported a
series of general principles:
The adhesion theory rationale is that the stronger party
may not limit its liability performance, as defined either by
law or by its representations, and towards this end,
(1) [any ambiguity in an objectionable adhesive term
will be seized upon and construed most strictly against the
drafter;
(2) [a]n unusual or unexpected term in an adhesion
contract which falls outside the weaker party's "reasonable
expectations" will be denied effect against him, unless it has
been brought to his attention by express notice, as by clear,
plain and conspicuous language on the face of the contract;
(3) [i]f an unreasonable adhesive term is unambiguous
and has been brought to the attention of the weaker party, a
court may still delete it on equitable grounds, as against pub-
lic policy.14
The earlier article criticized this approach as affording courts too
much latitude to rewrite substantive provisions in contracts, as "inher-
ently unfair and unpredictable because of the subjective nature of 'rea-
sonable expectations,'" and as unnecessary to the extent
10. Sybert, supra note 1, at 305-06 & n.59.
11. Id at 306 n.64, 307.
12. Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 315, 325, 122 Cal. Rptr. 816,
822 (Ist Dist. 1975) (emphasis deleted).
13. Sybert, supra note 1, at 308-09.
14. Id at 309-10.
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unconscionability or other equitable doctrines were available to reach
the same result. 5 Instead, the article suggested that an explicit proce-
dural approach be taken to require clear notice of all terms in truy
adhesive contracts (no choice as to terms, and no reasonable or mean-
ingful choice as to the substantive transaction) of a "public nature,"16
and otherwise to treat a contract of adhesion no differently from any
other contract:
The proposal, then, is to confirm the utility of a special-
ized approach to contracts that are truly adhesive-those
transactions which the weaker party realistically must enter
and whose terms he must accept-and to redefine or confirm
the nature of that approach, adhesion theory, as essentially
procedural and as one going to notice.
This proposal might be set forth as follows:
1. Standard rules for construction and interpretation of
contracts, including the rule construing ambiguities against
the drafter, apply to truly adhesive contracts exactly as they
do to any others.
2. Terms in truly adhesive contracts of a public nature
that shock the conscience will be stricken on grounds of pub-
lic policy applicable to such contracts particularly, or on
grounds of unconscionability applicable to all contracts. A
truly adhesive contract will be deemed to be of a public na-
ture if it satisfies the first or a number of the Tunkl criteria, or
has been assigned that status by non-adhesion theory judicial
15. Id at 312.
16. Id at 321;see Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), the first important California adhesion case, setting forth a number of
factors to determine whether a transaction reaches the public interest. In that case, a hospi-
tal sought to exempt itself from liability through a hospital admission procedure:
It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation.
The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great impor-
tance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members
of the public. The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any
member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within cer-
tain established standards. As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the
economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a de-
cisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who
seeks his services. In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts
the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no
provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain pro-
tection against negligence. . . .As a result of the transaction, the person or prop-
erty of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of
carelessness by the seller or his agents.
Id at 98-101, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38 (footnotes omitted).
1983]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW RE VIEW
decision (e.g., antitrust determination of monopoly) or by leg-
islative indication.
3. All terms in truly adhesive contracts of a public na-
ture must be presented to the weaker party in a clear, under-
standable and noticeable way, such that a reasonable person
would be apprised of them.
4. If there has been no effective notice of a given term,
and it is not reasonable, the adherer will not be bound by it. 17
How, then, have California courts run with adhesion theory in the
last several years? As we see below, in different directions at once.
III. THE NEW CASES
A. Voices from the Past: Jones v. Crown Life; Meyers v. Guarantee
Savings and Loan
Two of the recent cases demonstrate the different applications of
adhesion theory as it has traditionally been applied, one application
being expansive and substantively oriented, and the other restrictive
and procedurally oriented.
In Jones v. Crown Life Insurance Co. ,8 the court of appeal fol-
lowed traditional application of adhesion theory in California. An 18
year-old employee of a lumber company died in a traffic accident at
12:30 in the morning when his car went off the road at approximately
80 m.p.h. around a curve in a 35 m.p.h. zone. There was evidence,
including analysis of blood alcohol content, that the deceased was in-
toxicated and incapable of safely operating a car at the time.
The victim had been covered by an employer-sponsored group life
and health insurance program which provided for additional payment
benefits in case of accidental death. Employees were afforded the op-
portunity to read a copy of the policy in the employer's office, but were
not given a copy themselves. Instead, they were given a booklet written
by the staff of the defendant insurer which described the policy, but
omitted any mention of a provision which excluded the additional acci-
dental death benefit if the employee had committed a criminal offense
(Le., such as drunk driving) which contributed to his or her demise.
The court of appeal affirmed the judgment in favor of the em-
ployee's estate that the additional benefit should be paid. The insur-
ance program contract was adhesive since the employees either had to
17. Sybert, supra note 1, at 321.
18. 86 Cal. App. 3d 630, 150 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1st Dist. 1978).
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accept the plan or "contract individually for health and life insurance
at a much higher rate." 19 Further, the employer had not negotiated the
policy, but had merely selected one from among the seven insurance
companies considered, three or four of which offered the same cover-
age. Finally, the provision in question limited the insurer's obligations,
rather than merely changing dispute forums.20 Therefore, the limitation
was ineffective, and the additional benefit was payable, since the de-
ceased's "reasonable expectations" would have been that he was
covered.
The decision in Jones demonstrates precisely the problems with
adhesion theory that were discussed in the earlier article: the "reason-
able expectations" test, rather than being an objective standard, is sub-
ject to manipulation. As the defendant in Jones unsuccessfully argued,
"no reasonable person could expect coverage for his death when his
death results from the operation of a motor vehicle at an excessive
speed on a two-lane road while under the influence of alcohol.' Yet
the Jones court rejected this evident proposition and substantially re-
wrote the contract. 22 No doubt this resulted in higher insurance costs
for all employees, including those whose drinking habits were less
irresponsible.
23
19. Id at 638, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
20. This was unlike the arbitration clause in question in an earlier case, Madden v. Kai-
ser Found. Hosp., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1976). See Sybert,
supra note 1, at 302. The Jones court further distinguished Madden in that the group medi-
cal plan in that case was held not to be adhesive, where the employee's retirement group had
equal bargaining strength with the insurer or health provider, and where the individual
employee was offered the choice between several different medical plans as well as the op-
portunity to contract individually for his own. Jones, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 637, 150 Cal. Rptr.
at 378.
The Madden court had identified three factors in "the characteristic adhesion contract
case.
[1] [T]he stronger party drafts the contract, and the weaker has no opportu-
nity. . . to negotiate concerning its terms ....
[2] In many cases of adhesion contracts, the weaker party lacks. . . also any
realistic opportunity to look elsewhere for a more favorable contract; he must
either adhere to the standardized agreement or forego the needed service ....
[3] Finally, in all prior contract of adhesion cases, the courts have concerned
themselves with weighted contractual provisions which served to limit the obliga-
tions or liability of the stronger party.
17 Cal. 3d at 711, 552 P.2d at 1185-86, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 889-90.
21. 86 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
22. But cf. Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 528 (1974) (insured would not have reasonably expected noncoverage in case of death
while intoxicated).
23. The Jones decision continues the ill-advised approach taken by the California
Supreme Court in Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1962), which was criticized by the earlier article for the same reason. See discus-
LOYOLA_ OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
The 1978 case of Meyers v. Guarantee Savings and Loan Associa-
tion24 stands in sharp contrast to Jones. It exemplifies the application
of traditional adhesion theory in a strict procedural manner, cast solely
in terms of notice, as suggested by the earlier article. Meyers involved
an action by a builder to foreclose his mechanics lien against defend-
ants' partially constructed house. The defendants cross-complained
against the savings and loan association which had financed the con-
struction, charging that monies had been paid to the contractor wrong-
fully and without the required inspection of the work. The savings and
loan brought a motion for summary judgment.
The homeowner defendants argued that under the loan agreement,
the lender had a duty to inspect the construction and that if it failed to
do so but continued to make payments to the contractor, it would be
liable for the damages. The terms of the loan agreement, however,
stated that the lender was not required to make any such inspections.
Accordingly, summary judgment was granted. On appeal, the home-
owner attempted to avoid the contract language by characterizing the
agreement as adhesive, but the court of appeal found that he had read
and understood the contract, that there was no ambiguity or uncer-
tainty in it, and that his alleged subjective expectations were therefore
not objectively reasonable. Adhesion contracts, the court ruled, were
enforceable according to their terms absent any ambiguities.2 5
Thus, the decision in Meyers focuses, as the earlier article sug-
gested, on the adherer's notice of the challenged term. The court did
not indulge in the opportunity to decide what a homeowner's "reason-
able expectations" should be. Perhaps it was foreclosed from doing so,
since, unlike Steven26 and Jones, the homeowner had actually read the
contract. The tone of the decision does not indicate that the court
would have been so inclined in any event.
sion in Sybert, supra note 1, at 315-16. In Steven, the plaintiffhad purchased a standardized
air traveller's insurance policy from an airport vending machine. He had then taken a small
chartered airplane instead of his scheduled flight, and died when the plane crashed because
of bad weather which had grounded all scheduled carriers. The policy did not cover un-
scheduled flights. In the majority opinion, Justice Tobriner found coverage on the ground
that the insured would have reasonably expected it, and because the coverage exclusion had
not been brought home to him. Chief Justice Traynor dissented on the ground that a pur-
chaser would not reasonably expect coverage for other than scheduled carriers. The earlier
article submitted that Justice Traynor was right. Cases like Steven and Jones demonstrate
the dangers of a "reasonable expectations" test because it is highly subjective and capable of
being manipulated to reach the "right" result.
24. 79 Cal. App. 3d 307, 144 Cal. Rptr. 616 (5th Dist. 1978).
25. Id at 312, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (citing Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co., 49
Cal. App. 3d at 315, 325, 122 Cal. Rptr. 816, 822 (1st Dist. 1975)); see supra note 12.
26. See supra note 23.
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B. The Arbitration Cases
Since 1978 California courts have rendered a number of decisions
concerning arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion. Beynon v.
Garden Grove Medical Group27 follows earlier trends of applying adhe-
sion theory to cases which usually involve other factors as well.28 In
Steven, for example, the court emphasized the fact that the air traveller
had to buy his insurance policy before reading it. 9 In another impor-
tant adhesion case, Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California,30 the
court based its holding on California Civil Code section 1668,'3 1 which
specifically addresses exculpatory clauses; the adhesive nature of the
transaction was simply listed as one of a series of factors to be
considered.3
A second "arbitration" case, Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. ,33 fol-
lowed by a third, Hope v. Superior Court,3 4 is more startling in its appli-
cation of adhesion theory to commercial settings. Although there may
be a contract of adhesion in a commercial setting if the required ele-
ments, such as bargaining disparity, are present,35 adhesion theory is
generally applied in consumer settings because of the greater disparity
of bargaining power,36 and no doubt because of the courts' greater will-
ingness to protect non-business parties.
Beynon, Graham and Hope are significant in that all three cases
ignored indications that the parties were not unequal in bargaining
power. Thus, these decisions may herald an even greater, unwelcome
activism by California courts in overriding the contract process and in
27. 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146 (4th Dist. 1980).
28. Sybert, supra note 1, at 312-13 nn.103-06.
29. See supra note 23.
30. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1973) states: "All contracts which have for their ob-
ject, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful
injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent,
are against the policy of the law."
32. 60 Cal. 2d at 99-100, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38.
33. 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981).
34. 122 Cal. App. 3d 147, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1st Dist. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910
(1982).
35. See, e.g., Player v. George M. Brewster & Son, Inc., 18 Cal. App. 3d 526, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 149 (3d Dist. 1971) (contractor and subcontractor). It is the inequality of bargaining
power, not the commercial or consumer characterization, which is ostensibly the determina-
tive factor. See Sybert, supra note 1, at 303 n.48. This could also explain the result in
Scissor-Tail, see supra note 32, where third-party, union power dictated contract terms and
deprived either side of bargaining. It is simply that such inequality is usually found in
consumer contexts. Sybert, supra note 1, at 303.
36. Sybert, supra note 1, at 303.
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substantively rewriting private agreements.37 The Beynon decision in
particular is subject to this criticism. However, Graham and Hope also
show a far greater recognition of the role of unconscionability in adhe-
sion cases. These cases, therefore, offer the prospect that adhesion the-
ory may finally be restricted to its proper, procedural niche, and that
courts can be more candid about their grounds for invalidating sub-
stantive contract provisions.
In Beynon, the plaintiff employee was covered under a group
health care plan which had been entered into by a health care provider
and an employer group of which plaintiff's employer was apparently a
member. Plaintiff had submitted an application card seeking member-
ship in the plan "'as described in the master agreement and policy.' 1)38
She was given a descriptive brochure stating that " '[d]isputes involving
matters pertaining to the prepaid plans and care received or refused
must be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the Agree-
ment.'-"9 She was never provided with a copy of the actual policy.
The policy contained provisions for mandatory arbitration of disputes
by a three-arbitrator panel composed of one nominee selected by each
side, and a third selected by the first two arbitrators.4" However, the
policy also permitted the health care provider to reject the arbitrators'
decision if it was dissatisfied, and to resubmit the matter to a second
panel consisting of three doctors selected in the same manner.4
The plaintiff sued the health care provider for malpractice follow-
ing surgery. Her case was referred to arbitration and she won. The
provider, however, rejected the arbitration award pursuant to the pol-
icy provisions. The plaintiff then brought an action to confirm the
award, claiming that the provisions for rearbitration were void both as
a contract of adhesion and as against public policy.42 This position was
rejected by the trial court, but accepted on appeal.43 The court of ap-
peal, citing to Jones v. Crown Life Insurance Co., ruled that "there was
no evidence that the agreement was negotiated by parties having a par-
ity of bargaining strength or that plaintiff had a realistic opportunity to
37. Id at 312-15.
38. 100 Cal. App. 3d at 702, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
39. Id at 705, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
40. Id at 703 n.2, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49 n.2.
41. The court, however, assertedly did not object to the makeup of the second panel, but
to the provider's unilateral power to reject the decision of the first panel without cause and
to require rearbitration. Id at 712 n.9, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 154 n.9.




bargain or to seek a more favorable contract."' It was "manifest" that
the arbitration provisions providing for resubmission "unreasonably
limit[ed] the obligations of the health plan and health care provider
and defeat[ed] the reasonable expectations of one enrolling in the
plan."45 Therefore, the court reasoned that since the contract "pos-
sesses the attributes of a contract of adhesion," the plaintiff was not
bound.'
Several observations with regard to the Beynon court's reasoning
are immediately apparent. First, it ran roughshod over the question of
bargaining power; the employer's group, not the individual employee,
had negotiated the agreement. The court, however, treated the facts as
if the two negotiating parties, the employer's group and the health care
provider, were on the same side, and the employee on the other. The
court made the astonishing statement that, bargaining power or agency
principles notwithstanding, it would not tolerate contract provisions
with which it substantively disagreed:
[T]he implied authority of an agent to do everything
"proper and usual" to effectuate the purposes of the agency
(Civ. Code, § 2319) cannot be stretched to authorize the inclu-
sion in the master policy of the extraordinary provisions of
[the arbitration] paragraph. . . . A provision granting a uni-
lateral right to one party to reject an arbitration award with-
out cause and to require rearbitration before a special panel is
neither proper nor usual.47
The result-oriented view of the court is plain, particularly since it per-
mitted the first arbitration award to stand on the ground that the arbi-
tration provisions were severable inter se.48 There seems little doubt,
however, given the tone of the decision, that had the plaintiff lost the
first arbitration, the court would have been receptive to an adhesion
attack on that provision as well.
Secondly, Beynon should never have been an "adhesion" case.
Just as the prior article noted that many of the more important cases
presented other factors such as public policy, statutory provisions, or
unconscionability,49 the Beynon court's "real" ruling seemed to be:
"We have concluded that the provisions . . . are violative of public
44. Id at 705, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
45. Id at 706, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
46. Id
47. Id at 707, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
48. Id at 712-13, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
49. Sybert, supra note 1, at 312 nn.103-06, 317 nn.136-38. See discussion of Tunkl,
supra, note 16.
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policy and are therefore invalid. . . . [We declare] such fundamen-
tally unfair and unreasonable provisions in a health service plan con-
tract invalid on public policy grounds."5 Noting that there was
"widespread public reliance" on such contracts and that they had re-
cently been subject to extensive statutory regulation, 51 including a pro-
vision that all such contracts should be "fair, reasonable, and
consistent" with statutory objectives52 which included rational and in-
formed health consumer choices, 53 the court stated that it might "de-
clare void as against public policy contracts which, though not
specifically forbidden by the Legislature, are clearly injurious to soci-
ety."54 The court concluded, in a transparently self-serving ipse dixit:
[T]here is no judicial intrusion into the legislative prerogative
in declaring the provisions [in question]. . . invalid on public
policy grounds. The statutory standard that health care serv-
ice contracts be "fair" and "reasonable" is but an expression
of adhesion contract principles which courts have developed
and applied over the years in the insurance context and an
articulation of the spirit and purposes of the Knox-Mills
Health Plan Act which the new act superseded.5 In light of
the almost universal public reliance upon prepaid health plan
service contracts and insurance as a means of obtaining and
paying for hospital and medical services, provisions which
can render arbitration a one-sided procedure weighted against
the subscriber are manifestly harmful to the public interest.5 6
Clearly the court's real concern was with the substantive content of
the rearbitration provision. It invalidated the provision, in reality, on
public policy grounds or something akin to unconscionability. Why,
then, was it necessary for the court to add gratuitously that the contract
was one of adhesion, when it was probably not? Adhesion theory os-
tensibly goes, or should go, to contractprocedure. Its use as a substan-
50. 100 Cal. App. 3d at 710, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
51. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1340-95 (West 1982); former CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12530-39.13; see 100 Cal. App. 3d at 710-11, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
52. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367(h) (West 1979).
53. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1342(b) (West 1982).
54. 100 Cal. App. 3d at 711-12, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (citations omitted).
55. The 1965 Knox-Mills Act, former CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12530-39.7, had proscribed
deceptive or misleading health plan membership contracts or advertising, id, §§ 12531,
12532. These provisions were largely carried over into the Knox-Keane Act of 1975, specifi-
cally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1360.
56. 100 Cal. App. 3d at 712, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
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tive tool is one of the major criticisms voiced in the earlier article.57
Similar criticism can also be made of the decisions in Graham v.
Scissor-Tail, Inc., 8 and Hope v. Superior Court,59 cases notable for
their application of adhesion theory to commercial settings. Scissor-
Tail, a decision by the California Supreme Court, involved two promi-
nent business entities of apparently relatively equal bargaining strength
in the field of music entertainment. Plaintiff Bill Graham was a pro-
moter and organizer of rock concerts, and defendant Scissor-Tail, Inc.,
was the corporate marketing vehicle for rock star Leon Russell.60 The
two entered into a contract for a series of concerts, but Graham was
apparently forced to use the musicians' union contract, a printed form
with non-negotiable terms.6' The only negotiable terms were those as
to playing dates and supporting musicians. Scissor-Tail was also effec-
tively forced to use this contract, since all members of the musicians'
union were obliged to use the same form. The contract required that
any disputes had to be settled in arbitration by an arbitration panel
61appointed by the musicians' union.
A dispute did in fact arise between the parties, and a former execu-
tive of the union was appointed to arbitrate.63 The award, as one might
suspect, was in favor of the performer, and Graham challenged the ar-
bitration provisions as the product of an unlawful contract of
adhesion.'
Even though Graham admitted that he had read and understood
the contract, and had in fact used such contracts many times, the court
ruled that his inability to obtain a neutral or impartial arbitrator made
this part of the contract unenforceable. 65 Former union executives, the
court held, would not provide a fair, unbiased arbitration hearing.
Therefore, the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforce-
able because "minimum levels of integrity" 66 were not achieved.
The situation in Scissor-Tail is a little unusual in that the presence
of a third party, the musicians' union, effectively ensured that there was
57. Sybert, supra note 1, at 312-15; see also discussion that adhesion theory may be
covert unconscionability, id at 317-18 n.138.
58. 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981).
59. 122 Cal. App. 3d 147, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1st Dist. 1981).
60. 28 Cal. 3d at 812, 623 P.2d at 167, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
61. Id at 812-13, 818-19, 623 P.2d at 167-68, 172, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 607, 610-11.
62. Id at 813, 623 P.2d at 168, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
63. d at 815, 623 P.2d at 169, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09.
64. Id at 817, 623 P.2d at 170, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10.
65. Id at 821, 828, 623 P.2d at 173, 178, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13, 617.
66. 28 Cal. 3d at 828, 623 P.2d at 178, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
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no bargaining and that the form contract was adhesive for both sides,
although obviously it would favor the performer, if anyone. Perhaps
this explains the application of adhesion theory to a commercial set-
ting, with two parties possessing bargaining power. The case plainly
represents an aberrant application of the doctrine of adhesion contracts
because the arbitration clause most assuredly did not fail to meet the
plaintiff's "reasonable expectations," since he had admittedly read the
provision and in fact was quite familiar with it.
Instead, Scissor-Tail, like Beynon, is an unconscionability decision;
the arbitration clause was invalid because it did not meet "minimum
levels of integrity":
Generally speaking, there are two judicially imposed limi-
tations on the enforcement of adhesion contracts or provisions
thereof. The first is that such a contract or provision which
does not fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker
or "adhering" party will not be enforced against him. (See,
e.g., Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal. 2d 263, 271-
272, [54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168]; Steven v. Fidelity & Cas-
ualty Co. (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 862, 869-870, [27 Cal. Rptr. 172,
377 P.2d 284]; Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, supra, 63 Cal.
App. 3d 345, 357; see generally Sybert, supra, at pp. 305-306,
and cases there cited.) The second--aprinciple of equity appli-
cable to all contracts generally-is that a contract or provision,
even f consistent with the reasonable expectations of theparties,
will be denied enforcement if, considered in its context, it is un-
duly oppressive or "unconscionable." . . .
We cannot conclude on the record before us that the con-
tractual provision requiring arbitration of disputes before the
A.F. of M. was in any way contrary to the reasonable expecta-
tions of plaintiff Graham. By his own declarations and testi-
mony, he had been a party to literally thousands of [such]
contracts containing a similar provision; indeed it appears
that during the 3 years preceding the instant contracts he had
promoted 15 or more concerts with Scissor-Tail, on each oc-
casion signing a contract containing arbitration provisions
similar to those here in question. It also appears that he had
been involved in prior proceedings . . . regarding disputes
with other musical groups arising under prior contracts. Fi-
nally, the discussions taking place following the. . . concert,
• . . all strongly suggest an abiding awareness on his part that
all disputes arising under the contracts were to be resolved by
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[such] arbitration . . . For all of these reasons it must be
concluded that the provisions requiring such arbitration...
were wholly consistent with Graham's reasonable expecta-
tions upon entering into the contract.67
However, the make-up of the designated arbitration panel was, in this
case, so one-sided as to render the agreement to arbitrate "illusory":
"[C]learly, 'minimum levels of integrity' are not achieved, and the
'agreement to arbitrate' should be denied enforcement on grounds of
unconscionability."r The court also specified a second, related ground,
that the provision effectively denied due process because it denied Gra-
ham a fair opportunity to be heard.69 Thus, there was no need nor
useful purpose to be served by invoking adhesion theory.
Scissor-Tail was followed by the case of Hope v. Superior Court.7 °
In Hope, the petitioners were account executives who had been em-
ployed at a securities broker's office under a standardized securities ac-
count executive employment contract which provided that all disputes
between employer and employee would be settled by a panel of arbitra-
tors. The petitioners were given the option of being fired or resigning,
chose the latter, and went to work for a competitor. They then brought
an action for past due commissions and various business torts against
their former employer, who invoked the arbitration clause in the em-
ployment contract.7 '
The court held that, as in Scissor-Tail, the panel of arbitrators was
associated with one party (the employer) so as to be presumptively bi-
ased in his favor.72 In Hope, the form of the contract was imposed by a
third party, the New York Stock Exchange, which was presumed to be
similarly biased. 73 As in Scissor-Tail, the Hope court found that this
arrangement failed to meet "minimal levels of integrity," and it was
held invalid.74 The court's analysis is for all intents and purposes the
same as that of the court in Scissor-Tail:
67. Id at 820-21, 623 P.2d at 172-73, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12 (emphasis added, foot-
notes omitted).
68. Id at 825, 623 P.2d at 176, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 615 (emphasis added).
69. Id at 825-26, 623 P.2d at 176-77, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
70. 122 Cal. App. 3d 147, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851.
71. Id at 149, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
72. Id at 154, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
73. Id, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
74. Id at 155, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 856. Cf. Dinong v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d
300, 174 Cal. Rptr. 590 (3d Dist. 1981), where it was held there was no obligation to select
impartial arbitrators. In that case, however, each party had the right to select an arbitrator.
The employer-employee context in Hope is more akin to a consumer than a commercial
setting because of the usual disparity of bargaining power.
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We must also conclude on the basis of the standards set forth
in Scissor-Tail that the arbitration provisions contained in the
contract were unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable.
Whether or not those pro visions were contrary to the reasonable
expectations of the parties is an issue we cannot determine on
this record; but here, as in Scissor-Tail, the arbitral body is so
associated with a party to the contract, i.e., Shearson, as to be
presumptively biased in favor of that party. 5
Subsequent decisions have consistently referred to Scissor-Tail as
an unconscionability or due process decision. In Pascal & Ludwig, Inc.
v. State of California,76 a building contractor unsuccessfully sought to
compel the state to arbitrate certain disputes. The court stated that
Scissor-Tail "holds that in a contract of adhesion an arbitration provi-
sion that would designate as sole arbitrator either an affected contrac-
tual party or one with identical interest in the outcome of the dispute is
unconscionable and unenforceable as a matter of state law and pol-
icy."77 In Appalachian Insurance Co. v. Rivcom Corp. ,TS the court, in
rejecting a variety of attacks on an even-handed arbitration clause in
an insurance policy, characterized Scissor-Tail as based on the denial
of a fair opportunity to be heard.79 In Painters District Council No. 33 v.
Moen,8° where the court permitted enforcement of a clause in a labor
contract requiring submission of employment grievances and disputes
to an unincorporated association of local painters' unions, with an arbi-
tration panel equally representative of both sides, Scissor-Tail was sim-
ilarly explained as a common law due process decision.8 '
These recent arbitration cases, however, because of their persistent
use of adhesion language in analyses which are plainly ones of uncon-
scionability or due process, offer only mixed hope that courts will cease
the improper use of adhesion theory as a smoke screen or as an addi-
tional ground for a finding of unconscionability, contravention of pub-
lic policy, or other ruling going to the substance of a contract. If
anything, the new decisions indicate that such use is now spreading to
the commercial area. There is no need for this application of adhesion
theory; it derogates from the more desirable use of the theory as a pro-
cedural tool as recommended in the prior article and as followed in the
75. 122 Cal. App. 3d at 154, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (emphasis added).
76. 127 Cal. App. 3d 178, 179 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1981).
77. Id at 184, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
78. 130 Cal. App. 3d 818, 182 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1982).
79. Id at 828-29, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
80. 128 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 181 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1982).
81. Id at 1039 n.3, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 20 n.3.
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Meyers case. The same results could be obtained with more direct rea-
son and without saddling adhesion theory with the baggage of other
substantive doctrines. Indeed, these recent cases are not adhesion deci-
sions, and they should not be cited as such.
C. Commercial Unconscionability: A & M Produce Co. v.
FMC Corp.
The decision of the court of appeal in August, 1982, in the case of
A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Cor. ,82 confirms rather explicitly that the
"adhesion" decisions are really ones of unconscionability in sheep's
clothing. The plaintiff in A & M Produce had bought agricultural
processing equipment from the defendant FMC. The equipment failed
to operate properly, and the plaintiff's crop was lost. The sales contract
for the transaction was on FMC's pre-printed form that contained pro-
visions on the back limiting and disclaiming warranties and conse-
quential damages which FMC claimed at trial were effective to defeat
plaintiff's claims. Both parties were commercial entities, albeit of dif-
ferent size; the plaintiff was a solely-owned farming company in Cali-
fornia's Imperial Valley whose operations were dwarfed by those of the
defendant multi-national corporation.
Plaintiff brought an action for breach of express and implied war-
ranties.83 At a third trial, following a hung jury in the first trial and a
new trial ordered in the second, the superior court ruled that it would
be unconscionable to enforce the warranty limitations. On the basis of
this determination, it excluded evidence of the contents of the agree-
ment's reverse side, on which the terms in question were located, and
upheld a substantial general verdict.
The court of appeal's decision upholding the lower court's eviden-
tiary ruling is prolix and couched in rather inartful language, and may
well be criticized on other grounds as making bad law. But for pur-
poses of adhesion theory, the court's decision makes it clear that the
adhesive nature of a transaction is only one factor to be taken into ac-
count in determining unconscionability.
The court of appeal first denied that the failure to enact Section 2-
302 of the Uniform Commercial Code in California prevented the ap-
plication of the doctrine of unconscionability in this state. Citing both
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. ,4 and Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. ,8"
82. 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (4th Dist. 1982).
83. Id at 480, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
84. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 23.
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as well as recently enacted Section 1670.5 of the California Civil Code,
the court declared that "[u]nconscionability has long been recognized
as a common law doctrine which has been consistently applied by Cali-
fornia courts in the absence of specific statutory authorization."
6
The court engaged in a rather tortured discussion of what it called
the two "elements" of unconscionability, "procedural" and "substan-
tive," focusing on the adhesive nature of a contract or transaction as
the key factor in the former.
The procedural element focuses on two factors: "oppres-
sion" and "surprise." . . . "Oppression" arises from an ine-
quality of bargaining power which results in no real
negotiation and "an absence of meaningful choice." ...
"Surprise" involves the extent to which the supposedly
agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix
printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the dis-
puted terms . . . . Characteristically, the form contract is
drafted by the party with the superior bargaining position.
Of course the mere fact that a contract term is not read or
understood by the nondrafting party or that the drafting party
occupies a superior bargaining position will not authorize a
court to refuse to enforce the contract. Although an argument
can be made that contract terms not actively negotiated be-
tween the parties fall outside the "circle of assent" which con-
stitutes the actual agreement . . . commercial practicalities
dictate unbargained-for terms only be denied enforcement
where they are also substantively unreasonable. . . . No pre-
cise definition of substantive unconscionability can be prof-
fered . . . . The most detailed and specific commentaries
observe that a contract is largely an allocation of risks be-
tween the parties, and therefore that a contractual term is sub-
stantively suspect if it reallocates the risks of the bargain in a
objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner . . . . But
not all unreasonable risk reallocations are unconscionable;
rather, enforceability of the clause is tied to the procedural
aspects of unconscionability. . . such that the greater the un-
fair surprise or inequality of bargaining power, the less unrea-
sonable the risk reallocation which will be tolerated.
8 7
86. 135 Cal. App. 3d at 485-86, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
87. Id at 486-87, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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The court entered into a long discussion of Graham v. Scissor-Tail,
Inc. 18 as an example of the case where these elements had been pulled
together to determine that the clause in question did not meet "mini-
mal levels of integrity." It then turned to the facts of its own case, and
disposed of the notion that the commercial context in which the trans-
action in question had occurred somehow lessened the court's review
power.
Turning first to the procedural aspects of unconscionabil-
ity, we note at the outset that this contract arises in a commer-
cial context between an enormous diversified corporation
(FMC) and a relatively small but experienced farming com-
pany (A & M). Generally, "courts have not been solicitous of
businessmen in the name of unconscionability.". . . This is
probably because courts view businessmen as possessed of a
greater degree of commercial understanding and substantially
more economic muscle than the ordinary consumer. Hence, a
businessman usually has a more difficult time establishing
procedural unconscionability in the sense of either "unfair
surprise" or "unequal bargaining power."
Nevertheless, generalizations are always subject to excep-
tions. . . . With increasing frequency, courts have begun to
recognize that experienced but legally unsophisticated busi-
nessmen may be unfairly surprised by unconscionable con-
tract terms. . . and that even large business entities may have
relatively little bargaining power, depending on the identity of
the other contracting party and the commercial circumstances
surrounding the agreement . . . . This recognition rests on
the conviction that the social benefits associated with freedom
of contract are severely skewed where it appears that had the
party actually been aware of the term to which he "agreed" or
had he any real choice in the matter, he would never have
assented to inclusion of the term .... 89
In short, the court found, probably correctly, that the mere fact that a
transaction takes place in a commercial context does not mean that it
cannot be adhesive. Disparity of bargaining power or other circum-
stances may still translate into the reality that one side has no choice.
Needless to say, this analysis can be carried on endlessly because there
are always degrees of disparity of bargaining power between parties; in
88. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
89. 135 Cal. App. 3d at 489-90, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124 (citations omitted).
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a real sense, any contract term may be agreed upon finally because the
party has decided it has reached the extent of its bargaining power, and
therefore has no "choice" to further negotiate a term. The commercial-
consumer distinction is a helpful "bright line" to prevent this sort of
slippery analysis.
The court then found that the transaction in question was proce-
durally unconscionable.90 First, the element of surprise was present
since the disclaimer provisions appeared in the middle of the back page
of a long form (ie., adhesion) contract which the defendant was shown
only casually. The defendant never read the other side, nor was it sug-
gested to him that he do so. The court decided somewhat cryptically
that this "surprise" was sufficiently "unfair" or "oppressive" (although
it did recognize that this was open to some dispute, since the defendant
certainly had the opportunity to read the form or to seek the advice of a
lawyer), because
[a]s a factual matter, given the complexity of the terms and
FMC's failure to direct his attention to them, [the defendant's]
omission may not be totally unreasonable . . . "The bur-
den should be on the party submitting [a standard contract] in
printed form to show that the other party had knowledge of
any unusual or unconscionable terms contained therein." 9'
The court stressed that the element of unfair surprise was most strongly
supported by the fact that the contract was a form contract and one of
adhesion. There was a "lack of any real negotiation."92
The court determined that the disclaimers, too, in question were
substantively unconscionable. Its overall conclusion was:
When non-negotiable terms on preprinted form agreements
combine with disparate bargaining power, resulting in the al-
location of commercial risks in a socially or economically un-
reasonable manner, the concept of unconscionability as
codified in Uniform Commercial Code sections 2-302 and 2-
719, subdivision (3), furnishes legal justification for refusing
enforcement of the offensive .result.93
What the A & M Produce decision really does, apart from its
rather questionable judicial intrusiveness and determination of social
policy, is to put adhesion theory in its proper place. As suggested less
90. Id at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
91. Id at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124 (quoting Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458,
462, 276 N.E.2d 144, 147-48 (1972)).
92. 135 Cal. App. 3d 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
93. Id at 493, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
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directly in Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. , Hope v. Superior Court,95 and
Beynon v. Garden Grove Medical Group,96 there should be no special-
ized "adhesion theory" at all. Instead, the adhesive nature of a contract
should be simply a factor to be taken into account in determining pro-
cedural unconscionability.97 Indeed, the earlier article suggested that
"adhesion theory" may be no more than covert unconscionability. 98
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts have finally shown some sign, in Graham v. Scissor-
Tail, Inc. and subsequent cases, that adhesion theory may be restricted
to procedural aspects of contract entry, Le., requiring notice of all
terms, and turning to unconscionability or public policy to deal with
egregious substantive terms. A & M Produce, while otherwise a rogue
decision, may be a step in that direction. However, the decisions have
largely continued to refer to the adhesive nature of a contract in strik-
ing down terms better dealt with, or actually dealt with, under other
rubrics. This approach has been extended both to commercial cases
and to cases where there may be no disparity of bargaining power. In
other cases, such as Jones,9 9 the doctrine has simply been misused. The
recent signs of a possible trend to the contrary should be encouraged to
reach the goal of an end to sloppy reasoning in support of judicial
activism.
94. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 27, 38-57 and accompanying text.
97. The court was almost certainly correct that unconscionability is still available in this
state. See Sybert, supra note 1, at 300 nn.19-24, 317 nn.132-34.
98. See Sybert, supra note 1, at 317 n.138. Both Tunkl, see supra note 30 and accompa-
nying text, and Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968),
were decided on the ground of "public policy," although adhesive factors played a part in
the courts' reasonings.
99. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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